This paper explores the manner in which race and income interact to determine patterns of residential location in metropolitan areas. We use a framework in which individuals care about both the level of affluence and the racial composition of their communities, and in which there are differences in income both within and between groups. Three main findings emerge. First, under certain conditions there exist stable equilibria in which, conditional on income, black households experience lower neighborhood quality relative to whites. Second, extreme levels of segregation can be stable when racial income disparities are either sufficiently large or sufficiently small, but unstable in some intermediate range. Third, there exist multiple stable equilibria with very different levels of segregation when racial income disparities are sufficiently small. These results hold even when preferences are pro-integrationist, in the sense that racially mixed neighborhoods within a certain range are strictly preferred by all households to homogenous neighborhoods of either type. * We thank
Introduction
Several decades have elapsed since the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination in employment and public education, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act extended these protections to the sale and rent of housing. Over this period racial disparities in educational attainment and household income have narrowed, a significant population of middle class African Americans has emerged, and the attitudes of white Americans towards integrated schools and neighborhoods have softened considerably. 1 In comparison with changes in laws, attitudes and the racial composition of the middle class, changes in black-white residential segregation over the past thirty years have been gradual and uneven. Many areas in which black households constitute a small percentage of the metropolitan population have witnessed greater integration, but segregation remains a striking feature of the urban landscape in several cities with large black populations.
Moreover, the levels of segregation experienced by black households are uniformly high across all income categories, and the relative segregation of different cities has remained remarkably stable for over a century. 2 The persistence of segregation has generally been attributed to some combination of racial income disparities, discrimination in real estate and credit markets, and preferences over neighborhood racial composition. Implicit in this characterization is the presumption that declining economic inequality should, ceteris paribus, result in lower segregation. This would certainly be the case if sorting across neighborhoods were based on income alone.
When individuals care also about the racial composition of their communities, however, the relationship between inequality and segregation is more complex and depends in subtle ways on both intraracial and interracial disparities in income. It is with this relationship that the present paper is concerned. We analyze a model in which incomes vary both within and between groups, and indi- Economic Advisors, 1998). In 1963 only 39% of white respondents disagreed with the statement that whites had a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhood; by 1996 this had risen to 86% (Schuman et al., 1997) .
Additional evidence on attitudes is discussed in Section 2 below.
2 See Denton and Massey (1988), Massey and Denton (1993) , Farley and Frey (1994) , and Cutler et al.
(1999) for evidence and interpretations, and Glaeser and Vigdor (2001) and Lewis Mumford Center (2001) for an analysis of the most recent data. viduals care about both the level of affluence and the racial composition of the communities in which they reside. This concern with racial composition may be pro-integrationist, in that households prefer some degree of mixing to homogenous neighborhoods of either type.
Individuals are able to locate in any neighborhood, provided that they are willing and able to outbid others to do so. 3 We focus on equilibrium allocations that are stable in the sense that small perturbations in the neighborhood of the equilibrium are self-correcting under the dynamics of decentralized neighborhood choice.
We obtain three main results. First, under certain conditions, there exist stable equilibria at which, conditional on income, black households experience lower neighborhood quality than white households. Such equilibria arise even when preferences over neighborhood racial composition are strongly pro-integrationist. This result depends crucially on the hypothesis that neighborhood racial composition matters to households, and could not arise if location decisions were based on income alone. 4 Second, extreme levels of segregation can be stable if racial income disparities are either very great or very small, but unstable in some intermediate range. When income disparities are large, segregation results from black households not being rich enough to afford the high rents of more affluent white neighborhoods, and when income disparities are negligible, it results from the fact that high income black households have less to gain in terms of improved neighborhood quality by moving to a white neighborhood. When racial income disparities are neither too large nor too small, on the other hand, segregation may be unstable so that the only stable allocations are integrated. A narrowing of racial income disparities is therefore consistent with increasing segregation and, from a cross-sectional perspective, one ought not to expect cities with the smallest racial income disparities to be the ones with the lowest levels of segregation.
Finally we show that when racial income disparities are sufficiently small, multiple equilibria exist, and these equilibria can differ dramatically in their corresponding levels of segregation. The existence of multiple equilibria suggests that although integration may become viable as racial income disparities lessen, history may trap a city in a segregated equilibrium. 3 This may not be possible in practice due to racial steering by real estate agents or discrimination in mortgage lending markets (Yinger, 1995) . We abstract from such overt discrimination because its effects on segregation are reasonably well understood, and because doing so allows us to better focus on the questions at hand. 4 The fact that white households experience higher neighborhood mean income than equally affluent black households has implications for the transmission of racial inequality across generations (Loury, 1977) . These intergenerational effects are not explored in the present paper but clearly constitute an important extension.
This is where social policy may be most effective: temporary incentives for integration may give rise to permanent effects. Integration comes at the cost of higher stratification by income, however, so integrationist policies need not be unambiguously welfare enhancing even when preferences are strongly pro-integrationist.
Our work is closely related to two literatures which deal with the decentralized dynamics of neighborhood choice. The idea that extreme levels of segregation can arise under a broad range of preferences over neighborhood composition was developed in seminal work by Schelling (1971 Schelling ( , 1972 . This analysis contains the important insight that even when all individuals prefer integrated neighborhoods to segregated ones, integration may be unsustainable in that a few random shocks can tip the system to a segregated equilibrium. It is difficult, therefore, to deduce anything about individual preferences from aggregate patterns of residential location. 5 While Schelling's analysis neglects the role of prices in rationing housing demand, broadly similar conclusions hold in models that take full account of adjustments in rents (Yinger, 1976 , Schnare and McRae, 1978 , Kern, 1981 . This literature neglects the fact that individuals consider both race and income when making location choices, and that forces acting to produce stratification by income can substantially mitigate the amount of racial segregation that results. While extreme levels of segregation are consistent with prointegrationist preferences in our model, it is also the case that, under certain circumstances, stable equilibria can entail greater integration than any individual, black or white, considers ideal.
There is also an extensive literature on neighborhood sorting when individuals differ with respect to their incomes and sort themselves across jurisdictions on the basis of neighborhood characteristics such as local taxation, redistribution, public education, or peer-effects (De Bartolome, 1990, Epple and Romer, 1991 , Benabou, 1992 , Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996 , Durlauf, 1996 , Epple and Platt, 1998 . Stratification by income occurs in many such models. What is missing from this body of work is the possibility that individuals care about certain intrinsic characteristics of those with whom they share their neighborhoods, that such preferences are themselves related to group membership. When there is inequality both within and between groups, adding these components to the analysis yields significant new insights that appear neither in the segregation literature descended from Schelling, nor 5 "People who have to choose between polarized extremes ... will often choose in a way that reinforces the polarization. Doing so is no evidence that they prefer segregation, only that, if segregation exists and they have to choose between exclusive association, people elect like rather than unlike environments." (Schelling, 1978, p.146) .
in the literature on neighborhood sorting in the Tiebout tradition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some discussion and justification for our key assumption that individuals care about both the racial composition and the level of affluence in their communities. The model is developed in Section 3, and its equilibrium properties characterized in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 examines the relationship between racial income disparities and residential segregation, and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in an Appendix.
Preferences
Extensive survey evidence on the racial attitudes of Americans has been collected for more than half a century (Schuman et al., 1997) . Several studies have specifically attempted to ascertain the preferences of respondents over neighborhood racial composition (Farley et. al., 1978 , Bobo et al., 1986 . The best recent evidence comes from a 'Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality' funded jointly by the Ford Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation.
Subjects drawn from the Los Angeles and Boston metropolitan areas were asked to construct an "ideal neighborhood that had the ethnic and racial mix" that the respondent "personally would feel most comfortable in". They did so by examining a card depicting three rows of five houses each, imagining their own house to be at the center of the middle row, and assigning to each of remaining houses an ethnic/racial category using the letters A (Asian), B (Black), W (White) and H (Hispanic). The study found evidence that "all groups prefer both substantial numbers of co-ethnic neighbors and considerable integration" (Zubrinsky Charles, 2001, p.257). On average, the ideal neighborhood consisted of a plurality of the respondent's own type (ranging from 40% for black respondents to 52% for whites) together with significant representation from other groups. Only 2.5% of blacks to 11.1% of whites considered homogeneous neighborhoods populated only with their own type to be ideal.
Overall, this reflects a clear desire for some degree of integration on the part of all groups, with a bias towards members of one's own group. This is consistent with prior studies of attitudes towards racial composition and motivates the specification used in this paper. preferences over neighborhood racial composition to be exogenously given, our specification is consistent with these interpretations. In addition, we allow for the possibility that there may be a preference for some degree of integration on the part of both blacks and whites, as suggested by the survey evidence.
In addition to a concern about neighborhood racial composition, we assume that individuals also care about the level of affluence in their communities. There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. The quality of public schools is liable to be better in more affluent neighborhoods even if government per-pupil expenditures are uniform across the city. This is the case because voluntary contributions to parent-teacher associations increase with income, and because human capital transfers that occur in the home have spillover effects in school. The presence of positive role models (and the absence of negative ones) is correlated with the degree of affluence of a community. Living an a more affluent community provides entry into social networks which can be lucrative. And if the external upkeep of one's residence is a normal good with positive external effects, more affluent communities will be more desirable. Each of these effects have been discussed extensively in the literature (Bond and Coulson, 1984 , De Bartolome, 1990 , and Benabou, 1992 . Although the desire to live in a more affluent community can be endogenously derived on the basis of any of the above concerns, it is treated here as a primitive of the model.
The Model
Consider a city with a continuum of households represented by the interval [0, 1]. Households differ along two dimensions, income and race. There are two races, black and white, and the share of black households in the city is denoted β ≤ these assumptions imply that whites are wealthier than blacks as a group, although the wealthiest black households are better off than the poorest white ones.
The city is divided into two disjoint neighborhoods of equal size. 6 Any subset A ⊂ [0, 1] with measure one-half represents an allocation of households across neighborhoods, with the interpretation that i ∈ A implies that household i resides in neighborhood 1, while the remaining households are in neighborhood 2. Any allocation of households across neighborhoods will imply both a racial composition and a distribution of income within each
the share of neighborhood j's population that is black, and ω j (A) = 1 − β j (A) the share of neighborhood j's population that is white.
Housing units are identical, and rents are accordingly uniform within each neighborhood.
We normalize the rent in neighborhood 1 to equal zero and let ρ be the (possibly negative) rent in neighborhood 2. All income not spent on rent is used for private consumption. Apart from their private consumption, individuals care about the general affluence and racial composition of their communities. Neighborhoods with higher mean incomes are more desirable than those with lower mean incomes for all members of the population. Additionally, black and white households differ systematically with regard to their preferences over neighborhood racial composition. We shall assume for simplicity that the preferences of blacks and whites are symmetric in a sense to be made clear below. We do not assume, however, that preferences are monotonic in neighborhood racial composition. In particular, we allow for the possibility that households strictly prefer a wide range of integrated neighborhoods to segregated ones, and that being part of a sizeable minority may be more attractive than being part of an overwhelming majority.
Preferences are represented by the following simple, separable utility function
where c is private consumption,ȳ is neighborhood mean income, r ∈ {β, ω} is the neighborhood population share of the individual's own race, u(c) is continuous, strictly increasing 6 Although the analysis in this paper is focused on the two neighborhood case, the main results characterizing the relationship between racial income disparities and equilibrium segregation (Propositions 3 and 4) can be appropriately modified to hold also in the case of an arbitrary number of neighborhoods.
and strictly concave, and v(r) is given by
The parameter η ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree to which residence with co-ethnics is desired.
When η = 0 each individual's ideal neighborhood racial composition consists of equal shares of blacks and whites. More generally, the ideal racial composition for an individual is to have a share , the range of neighborhood compositions that are strictly preferred to complete segregation includes allocations in which the individual is in a minority.
Equilibrium in this model is an allocation A of households across neighborhoods and a neighborhood 2 rent ρ such that no household prefers a neighborhood different from its own.
In other words, equilibrium requires that for any household i ∈ [0, 1] with income y, it must be the case that
where r = β for black households, r = ω for white households. We shall refer to an allocation in which each neighborhood contains members of both races as integrated, and all other allocations as segregated.
Intraracial Stratification
We say that an allocation is intraracially stratified if there exist threshold income levelsỹ When an allocation is intraracially stratified, the mean incomes and racial compositions in each neighborhood can all be expressed as a function of the threshold income level for white households. Let z =ỹ w denote the threshold income for whites. It must be the case that
, and z max
. When z = z min the upper-tail neighborhood consists exclusively of white households, and when z = z max the lower-tail neighborhood is exclusively white.
Given any value of z ∈ [z min , z max ], there exists a uniqueỹ
The thresholdỹ b (z) identifies the unique level of black income such that the blacks with income above this threshold and whites with income above z together constitute half the
At any intraracially stratified allocation z, the share of black households in neighborhood 1 is given by
where β 1 (z) ∈ [0, 2β] and β 2 (z) = 2β − β 1 (z). Mean incomes in the two neighborhoods arē
Hence all neighborhood characteristics relevant to households are fully determined by the threshold white income z.
When z = z min , there is complete residential segregation by race, with the second (allwhite) neighborhood having higher mean income. As z rises from this minimum value, the lowest income whites in the second neighborhood are replaced by the highest income blacks from the first, which leads to increasing income disparities across neighborhoods.
The point at which neighborhood income disparities are greatest occurs whenỹ b (z) = z.
This would be the outcome if sorting were based on income alone. 7 As z rises beyond this 7 If the largest black income lies below the median white income and if the black share of the metropolitan population is sufficiently small, there may be no z ∈ [z min , z max ] such thatỹ b (z) = z. In this case sorting by income alone would give rise to a segregated allocation and the largest income difference between the two neighborhoods would occur when z = z min .
point, overall stratification by income begins to decline. If β is sufficiently large, at some point the two neighborhoods have identical mean incomes; beyond this the second (uppertail) neighborhood has lower mean income since it consists of all but the poorest segments of the less affluent race together with a few of the wealthiest members of the more affluent race. Finally, when z = z max , the allocation is again segregated but with the most affluent whites sharing a neighborhood with the city's black population, while lower income whites live in a racially homogenous neighborhood.
We shall say that an allocation is symmetric if the two neighborhoods are identical with respect to both mean income and racial composition. It is easily shown that symmetric allocations exist and that any symmetric allocation will be an equilibrium when the neighborhoods have equal rents. Moreover:
Proposition 1 Equilibrium allocations must be either segregated, symmetric, or intraracially stratified.
Equilibrium allocations that are not intraracially stratified must therefore be either segregated or symmetric. Symmetric equilibria will be unstable under the dynamics of decentralized location choices. For instance, the movement of the wealthiest white households from one neighborhood to the other in exchange for poorer white households will result in disparities in mean income while preserving the equality of racial compositions. This would result in wealthier households (of both races) outbidding poorer ones to locate in the more affluent community. Hence stable integrated equilibria must be intraracially stratified.
Segregated equilibria which are not intraracially stratified can exist. Specifically, there can be an equilibrium in which the two neighborhoods have equal rents, all black households occupy the same neighborhood, and all white households are indifferent between the two neighborhoods. Since this allocation is not symmetric, the difference in mean income across neighborhoods must exactly compensate whites for differences in neighborhood racial composition. As in the case of symmetric allocations, such equilibria will also be unstable. A small movement of wealthier whites to one neighborhood in exchange for poorer whites will leave the racial compositions unaffected but tilt income disparities in such a way as to make whites strictly prefer the neighborhood which experiences the increase in mean income. Hence stable segregated equilibria must be intraracially stratified. Since stable integrated equilibria must also be intraracially stratified, we confine our attention in the remainder of this paper to intraracially stratified allocations. It is easily shown that ρ ≥ 0 at any such equilibria:
the upper-tail neighborhood cannot have lower rent than the lower tail neighborhood, even if the latter has higher mean income.
The following two examples illustrate the range of equilibrium possibilities. The first of these equilibria is segregated, with all black households in the first (lower-tail)
neighborhood together with a few of the lowest income white households. Neighborhood 2 is more affluent and exclusively white. The marginal white household, despite being of lower income than the most affluent black household, is willing to outbid the latter to live in the second neighborhood. This is a reflection of black-white differences in preferences over neighborhood racial composition. The second equilibrium is unusual in that the second neighborhood is both more affluent and predominantly black. The fact that the most affluent whites are willing to pay the equilibrium rent to live there is a reflection of the fact that preferences are pro-integrationist. We show below, however, that this latter equilibrium is unstable in a well-defined sense. Both equilibria in this example involve integration. As in the case of the segregated equilibrium of the previous example, the marginal white household, despite being of lower income than the marginal black household, is willing to outbid the latter to live in the more affluent upper-tail neighborhood. The second equilibrium starkly illustrates the impact of pro-integrationist preferences. The upper-tail neighborhood in this case is predominantly black and has lower income than the lower-tail neighborhood. Yet the wealthiest whites are willing to pay the equilibrium rent to live there. We show below that this equilibrium is unstable.
The next section introduces a simple notion of stability and shows that equilibria of the first type, in which the marginal white household is of lower income than the marginal black household, exist and are stable provided certain conditions are met.
Stable Equilibria
At any intraracially stratified allocation z, define the marginal bid-rent ρ w (z) as the maximum rent that a white household with income z is willing to pay to live in the upper-tail 
There will always exist finite pair of marginal bid rents which satisfy these indifference conditions provided that u(c) shows enough variation. We assume that this is indeed the case. Furthermore, this pair of marginal bid-rents is uniquely determined since u(c) is strictly increasing.
Any integrated allocation at which the two marginal bid-rents ρ w (z) and ρ b (z) coincide and are positive is an equilibrium allocation with the equilibrium rent being equal to the common marginal bid-rents. This is the case because the marginal households (with income z and y b (z) respectively) are indifferent between the two neighborhoods, while all other households have a strict preference for the neighborhood to which they are allocated.
Moreover, all integrated equilibria must be such that the marginal bid-rents coincide and are non-negative. At segregated equilibria the marginal bid-rents will generally differ, but it must be the case that all black households prefer the neighborhood in which they all reside.
Hence if all black households live in the lower-tail neighborhood, we must have ρ
while the inequality is reversed if all black households live in the upper-tail neighborhood. The marginal bid-rent functions for Example 1 are shown in Figure 1 . As noted above, the integrated equilibrium is unusual in that the upper-tail neighborhood, despite being more affluent, is predominantly occupied by members of the less affluent race. In fact, it is easy to see that this equilibrium must be unstable: a small perturbation in the allocation of households would lead to cumulative divergence away from this allocation. For z slightly below the equilibrium value z * , ρ w (z) > ρ b (z). Hence the marginal white household is willing to pay more than the marginal black household to live in the upper-tail neighborhood. This would lead to an inflow of whites into the second neighborhood, further reducing z. Since there is no other point at which ρ w (z) = ρ b (z), the only stable equilibrium involves complete segregation.
More formally, we say that an equilibrium allocation z * is stable if there exists a neigh- In Figure 1 , the only stable equilibrium involves segregation. The marginal bid-rent functions for Example 2 are shown in Figure 2 . Here segregation is unstable since ρ b (z min ) > ρ w (z min ). The wealthiest black households are now willing to outbid the poorest white households to live in an all-white neighborhood, in order that they may benefit from the higher mean income. The unique stable equilibrium is now integrated, and there is a second integrated equilibrium which is unstable. Socioeconomic stratification in the stable equilibrium is higher than in the previous example but still falls short of the maximum possible stratification. Increasing tolerance leads to greater integration, as one might expect, but it also leads to greater disparities in mean income across neighborhoods. Furthermore the unique stable equilibrium is characterized by the property that the marginal black household is more affluent than the marginal white household (ỹ b (z) > z). The following result shows that a stable equilibrium of this kind must always exist provided the black share of the population is sufficiently large and a further condition is met.
Proposition 2 Consider any η > 0 and suppose that β
The condition y b max > z min is a weak one, requiring only that the most affluent black household in the city is better off than the lowest income white in the upper-tail neighborhood under complete segregation. Since z min lies below the median income of white households, a sufficient condition for y b max > z min to hold for any β is that the highest black income exceed the median white income.
The equilibrium identified in Proposition 2 has the property that the wealthiest households in the lower income neighborhood will be black. In other words, there exists a range of incomes lying between z andỹ b (z) such that households falling within this range will be in the poorer neighborhood if and only if they are black. This group of households will also have higher levels of private consumption than white households with comparable incomes, since a smaller share of income is spent on housing. White and black households with the same income will therefore experience systematically different levels of neighborhood quality.
Note that Proposition 2 holds no matter how close to perfectly pro-integrationist (η = 0) preferences happen to be, and no matter how much integration occurs in equilibrium: under the stated conditions there will always exist a stable equilibrium in which a set of households experience lower neighborhood quality conditional on income if they are black. In the presence of human capital externalities, the income of this group of black households will underpredict the future economic success of their children relative to the income of white households, an effect that could not occur under stratification alone. This is a sobering thought. Even in a world without overt discrimination, and one in which the desire for integration is strong, the advantage of being born to affluence may be magnified if one is also born to an affluent race.
Proposition 2 does not rule out stable equilibria in whichỹ b (z) ≤ z, although the above examples clearly demonstrate that none may exist. Furthermore, it can be shown that at any integrated equilibrium withỹ b (z) ≤ z, the upper-tail neighborhood must have a larger share of black households than the lower-tail neighborhood, and that there exist at least as many unstable equilibria with this property as stable ones.
Income Disparities and Segregation
We turn next to the relationship between income disparities and the extent of segregation, The above example is robust in that when racial income disparities are sufficiently small, and preferences are sufficiently pro-integrationist, a stable integrated equilibrium always exists:
Proposition 4 There existη > 0 andᾱ < 1 such that if η <η and α >ᾱ both hold, a stable integrated equilibrium exists.
In combination with Proposition 3, one implication of this result is that multiple stable equilibria exist when preferences over neighborhood racial composition are sufficiently prointegrationist, racial disparities in the distribution of income are small, and the black share of the metropolitan population is sufficiently large. When α = 1 the integrated equilibrium involves identical neighborhood racial compositions and complete stratification by income.
In the limiting case when such disparities disappear, there is a stable equilibrium in which there is effectively no racial segregation in residential patterns.
Propositions 3 and 4 may be illustrated by looking at a special case. Suppose that the black and white income distributions are both uniform with supports [0, (1 − α) , 1] respectively, with all other specifications as in Example 2. The manner in which the set of stable equilibria varies with racial income disparities α is shown in Figure 4 .
When racial income disparities are extreme (α close to zero) complete segregation is the only stable outcome. As racial income disparities narrow there comes a point when the segregated equilibrium loses stability and the unique stable equilibrium involves some degree of mixing.
Beyond this point, convergence of incomes goes hand in hand with greater integration.
Eventually α crosses a threshold and multiple equilibria arise, with complete segregation becoming stable. Further convergence of incomes can lead to persistent segregation or to increasing integration: depending on which of the equilibria is selected. When the two income distributions are identical (α = 1) the two stable equilibria are at polar extremes:
one segregated and the other perfectly integrated with the neighborhoods having identical racial compositions. Another implication of Proposition 4 is that stable equilibria can exist which involve higher levels of integration than any household, black or white, considers ideal. For example, if η = β = 1/2, the ideal neighborhood for each household requires that it be in a 75%
majority. Yet if α = 1, a stable equilibrium exists in which there is complete stratification by income, and exactly half the households in each neighborhood are black. To see why this is stable, suppose that random perturbations cause z to rise so that the second neighborhood is now majority black. Based on preferences over neighborhood composition alone, the marginal black household would outbid the marginal white household for housing in the second neighborhood, leading to cumulative divergence from the equilibrium. But with z exceeding 1 2 , the marginal black household is less affluent than the marginal white household.
Based on preferences for neighborhood mean income alone, the latter would outbid the former for housing in the second neighborhood. The combined effect of these two forces determines whether integration is stable. If preferences over neighborhood racial composition are not too strong, the latter effect dominates and integration is stable.
The results in this section suggest that racial disparities in the distribution of income play a subtle and important role in determining patterns of segregation. Even when preferences are strongly pro-integrationist and the ideal neighborhood for all individuals is close to perfectly mixed, complete segregation can result if racial income disparities are negligible or extreme. Multiple equilibria are inevitable when racial income disparities are small. The existence of multiple equilibria suggests that although stable integration may become viable as racial income disparities lessen, a city may remain trapped in the basin of attraction of the segregated equilibrium due to historical patterns of segregation. This is where social policy may be most effective: temporary incentives for segregation may give rise to permanent effects.
In the simple model considered here, the integrated equilibrium results in greater social surplus if preferences are sufficiently pro-integrationist. Integration comes at the cost of greater stratification, however, and this conclusion need not hold once the efficiency effects of stratification are accounted for. These effects can arise because the quality of one's neighborhood affects incentives for human capital accumulation, and hence also aggregate production and growth (Benabou 1996) . There are conditions under which stratification by income can be efficiency-reducing, in which case integrationist policies need not be unambiguously welfare improving even when preferences are pro-integrationist. In addition, a shift to an equilibrium with greater integration (and correspondingly greater stratification) lowers neighborhood quality in the poorest neighborhood, which consists disproportionately of black households. The movement of upper-income black households to more affluent communities worsens the conditions for those left behind; a point that has been emphasized by Wilson (1987) . 8 Finally, our results imply that one cannot expect a narrowing of racial income disparities to lead inevitably to lower segregation. While the convergence of incomes might imply greater integration at integrated equilibria, it may also cause segregated allocations to become stable.
From a cross-sectional perspective, cities with lower levels of racial inequality need not be the least segregated. And from a historical perspective, the march towards greater integration may be halted and reversed in some cities as racial inequality declines.
Conclusions
Given the nation's long history of slavery and de jure segregation, race has a degree of salience in American life that perhaps exceeds that of any other socially designated attribute.
Although racial attitudes will doubtless continue to evolve, preferences over neighborhood racial composition will remain an important factor affecting household location decisions in the foreseeable future. Such preferences are reflected in the patterns of segregation and stratification that prevail, but in subtle and sometimes unexpected ways.
The main results of our analysis may be summarized as follows. When the black share of the metropolitan population is sufficiently large and racial income disparities are not too extreme, there exist stable equilibria in which black households experience lower neighborhood quality conditional on income than white households. This does not arise from overt discrimination, and is consistent with a desire on the part of all households to live in integrated communities. Segregated allocations are stable when racial income disparities are either very great or very small, but may be unstable when racial inequality lies in some intermediate range. And multiple equilibria arise when racial income disparities are narrow, with extreme segregation and high levels of integration both being consistent with stability.
Our analysis is abstract enough to permit other interpretations. If, instead of race, the dominant attribute governing location decisions were linguistic preference, religious affiliation, or any other observable trait, our basic findings would continue to apply. It is also not necessary to interpret neighborhoods in a spacial sense: interaction in clubs or other voluntary associations will be subject to the same kind of dynamics. One could consider wealth rather than income disparities, and owned rather than rented housing without substantive modification to the model.
The most obvious significant extension of this work would be to allow for the endogenization of income distributions in an intergenerational context. The consideration of a broader class of preferences, intrinsic differences in neighborhood quality, and multiple racial or ethnic groups is also potentially important. Exploring these extensions will yield answers to new questions, generate additional insights, and determine the extent to which the basic insights emerging in this paper hold under more general conditions.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let (z * , ρ * ) be an equilibrium and suppose first that ρ * = 0. Then if any household strictly prefers a neighborhood so do all households belonging to the same race. At any integrated equilibrium there must be black and white households in each neighborhood, so all households must be indifferent between the two neighborhoods. This implies
Using (1), and the fact that ω j = 1 − β j we obtain for any allocation z
In particular, this is true for z = z * so (2-3) both hold only if
Hence if ρ * = 0 equilibrium allocation must be either segregated or symmetric.
Next suppose ρ * 6 = 0 and, without loss of generality, let ρ * > 0. Then for any household with income y in neighborhood 2,
where r = β if the household is black and r = ω otherwise. Since u is strictly concave, all households of the same race but with income greater than y strictly prefer neighborhood 2.
Hence if ρ * 6 = 0 the equilibrium is intraracially stratified.
Proof of Proposition 2
min < z max , the continuity and strict decreasingness ofỹ b (z) imply a uniqueẑ which satisfiesỹ
The marginal bid-rents atẑ are defined by the indifference conditions
). This in turn implies that the above indifference conditions can only hold if
Then there is a stable equilibrium at (z min , ρ w (z min )) if and only if ρ w (z min ) ≥ 0. To see that ρ w (z min ) ≥ 0 holds, note that ω 1 (z min ) = 1 − 2β and ω 2 (z min ) = 1, so from the definition of ρ w we have
If β > (1 − η) /2, then from (1), we have
This, together with (5) and the fact thatȳ 2 (z min ) >ȳ 1 (z min ), this implies u (z min − ρ w (z min )) < u(z min ) and therefore ρ w (z min ) > 0. Hence (z min , ρ w (z min )) is a stable equilibrium. Sincẽ
the continuity of ρ b (z) and ρ w (z) implies that there exists some z * ∈ (z min ,ẑ) such that 
Since β 1 (z * ) > β 2 (z * ) we have v(β 1 (z * )) −v(β 2 (z * )) > v(ω 1 (z * )) − v(ω 2 (z * )) from (4). Hence
which, since u is concave, implies that z * >ỹ b (z * ). But since z * <ẑ andỹ b (z) is strictly decreasing we must haveỹ b (z * ) > z * , a contradiction. Therefore ρ * ≥ 0 and (z * , ρ * ) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3
First consider part (a). Define ∆(y, ρ) ≡ u(y) − u (y − ρ) . Since u is strictly concave, ∆ is strictly decreasing in y whenever ρ > 0, and strictly increasing in ρ. The conditions defining the bid-rents for the marginal households are therefore ∆(z, ρ w ) +ȳ 1 (z) −ȳ 2 (z) + v (ω 1 ) − v (ω 2 ) = 0 (7)
Consider the pair (z * , ρ * ) = (z min , ρ w (z min )). Since z * is segregated, β 1 (z * ) = 2β, β 2 (z * 
Since the income distributions are identical at α = 1 we have β 1 = β 2 = β. This implies from (10-11) that ρ w (z) = ρ b (z) > 0 so z is an equilibrium. Let ρ denote the equilibrium rent at z. Then, since v 0 (r) = 1 − 2r + η andỹ b (z) = z, we have
The equilibrium rent ρ is determined implicitly by u(z) − u(z − ρ) +ȳ 1 (z) −ȳ 2 (z) = 0,
and so ρ is independent of η. This, together with (12) and the fact thatỹ b is strictly decreasing in z, implies that there existsη > 0 such that for all η <η,
Hence for all η <η the equilibrium is stable. To complete the proof we need only show that if an integrated equilibrium is stable for α = 1, there must existᾱ < 1 such that a stable and integrated equilibrium exists for all α >ᾱ. But this follows from the continuity of the marginal-bid rent functions in α.
